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Direct Mailings by Attorneys: Which End of
the Spectrum?
INTRODUCTION
Regulating the use of direct mailings from attorneys to potential
clients has been a problem for both the bar and the courts.' The
difficulty is due in large part to confusion over whether direct mail-
ings should be classified as advertising or as solicitation.2 Gener-
ally, to advertise is to announce, to inform, or to call to the public
attention. 3 To solicit is to awake or excite to action, usually imply-
ing a personal petition to a particular individual to do some partic-
ular thing.4  Direct mailings contain elements of both. Like
advertisements, direct mailings can be used to inform the recipient
of the attorney's services and to explain the fees.5 Direct mailings
are also like solicitations, however, because they are private com-
munications between the attorney and the recipient, urging the lat-
ter to take some kind of action.6
In the days when both advertising and solicitation by attorneys
were banned, the problem of correctly classifying direct mailings
had little significance.7 As the freedom of speech protections of the
first amendment began to be applied to commercial speech, restric-
tions on attorney advertising were gradually eased.' Solicitation,
however, continued to be prohibited.9 As a result, a continuum
emerged. At one end of this continuum truthful advertisements
are readily permissible10 and at the other extreme, private solicita-
1. See infra notes 122-24 and the accompanying text.
2. If the mailings are classified as advertisements, they can be regulated but not pro-
scribed. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. If mailings are classified as solici-
tations, they can be more strictly regulated or even prohibited. See infra notes 53, 58-68
and accompanying text.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 50 (5th ed. 1979).
4. Id. at 1249. There is some degree of overlap between the two extremes of advertis-
ing and solicitation. For example, advertising of any type involves some aspect of solici-
tation. In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146, 412 N.E.2d 927, 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981), and solicitation can be viewed as a means of
getting an advertising message across. L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER
ADVERTISING & SOLICITATION 61 (1980).
5. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
10. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (a state cannot completely pro-
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tion can be clearly proscribed.ll Direct mailings fall somewhere in
the middle, and it has been up to the individual states to determine
the manner in which the issue should be resolved. 2
Illinois has attempted to define the position that direct mailings
occupy on this continuum in the recently amended Rule 2-103 of
the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility ("Illinois Code"). 3
This rule allows an attorney to initiate contact with a prospective
client by means of a written communication distributed generally
to persons who might find the attorney's services useful. 14 The
question remains, however, whether the new Illinois Code Rule 2-
103 ("Rule 2-103" or "the Rule") adequately and constitutionally
deals with the practice of direct mailings.
This note will examine the historical justifications for the prohi-
bition on attorney advertising and solicitation. It will then trace
the breakdown of the prohibitions against advertising from the
United States Supreme Court cases to the corresponding modifica-
tions of the Illinois and other jurisdictions' codes of professional
responsibility. Next, this note will compare the two basic ap-
proaches used by the states to regulate direct mailings. Particular
attention will be given to the newly amended Illinois Rule 2-103
and to the recent challenge that has been waged against it. Finally,
this note will examine the competing concerns underlying the use
of direct mailings to determine whether the Illinois rule balances
these concerns fairly, intelligently, and constitutionally.
scribe truthful newspaper advertising concerning routine legal services). See infra notes
43-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bates.
11. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (a state can prohibit solici-
tation by attorneys in circumstances likely to pose certain dangers to the public). See
infra note 68 and accompanying text. Other forms of commercial speech that can be
prohibited include advertising that is "false, deceptive, or misleading," Bates, 433 U.S. at
383, and advertising that relates to illegal activity, id. at 384. See infra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
13. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2-103 (amended 1984).
("ILLINOIS CODE") The rule was amended on April 6, 1984 and became effective on July
1, 1984.
14. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b) (amended 1984). The rule provides in pertinent
part that a lawyer may initiate contact with prospective clients
by written communication distributed generally to persons not known in a spe-
cific matter to require such legal services as the lawyer offers to provide but who
in general might find such services to be useful and providing that such letters
• . . and the envelopes containing them are plainly labeled as advertising
material.
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HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROHIBITING
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
During the early days of the bar, attorneys were prohibited from
both soliciting and advertising for clients. 5 At that time, the prohi-
bition was more a matter of professional etiquette than one of eth-
ics.16 There were two basic reasons for prohibiting advertising and
solicitation. First, the members of the profession were from well-
to-do families who considered the law as a form of public service
rather than as a means of making a living.'7 Advertising or solicit-
ing for clients was seen as characteristic of a mere trade, and there-
fore was thought to lessen the traditional dignity of the
profession.' 8 Second, the prohibition was deemed necessary to pro-
tect the public from such abuses as barratry, champerty and
maintenance.19
The American bar continued the tradition of absolutely prohibit-
ing advertising and solicitation.20 The first formal prohibition ap-
15. The roots of this prohibition can be traced as far back as the advent of Christian-
ity where lawsuits were seen as evil in and of themselves. The basis for this belief was
that litigiousness evinced a quarrelsome spirit which was inconsistent with the Christian
ideals of charity and forgiveness. Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Pierc-
ing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMETrE L.J. 221, 223 n.10 (1977).
16. It has been suggested that since the barristers usually lived and trained together
at the Inns of Court, the prohibition against advertising and solicitation was a means of
promoting harmony in the profession. "Obviously this intimacy would have been impos-
sible for men who were continually blowing their professional horns and plotting to steal
away one another's clients...." H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210 (1953).
17. "[T]he gaining of a livelihood was but an incident." Id. at 210.
18. Id. at 210. This opinion of advertising and solicitation still exists among many
attorneys. In a 1984 survey taken by the American Bar Association, 58% of the respon-
dents stated that they viewed advertising as unprofessional. This concern was expressed
equally by both older and younger attorneys. Reskin, Lawyer Advertising Levels Off, P.R.
Use Growing, 70 A.B.A. J. 48, 49 (June 1984).
19. Note, In re R.M.J.: Reassessing the Extension of First Amendment Protection to
Attorney Advertising, 32 Cath. U. L. Rev. 729, 732 (1983). "Barratry" is the offense of
frequently stirring up quarrels and suits. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 137 (5th ed. 1979)
"Champerty" is the offense in which a stranger agrees to carry on a lawsuit at his own
expense for one of the parties involved in return for a share of the eventual reward. Id. at
209. "Maintenance" is any attempt by a stranger to promote, maintain, or support the
litigations of another. Id. at 860. Similarly, in ancient Greece and Rome, solicitation was
prohibited in part because it was feared that it would lead to "domination of society by
the rich who could hire the best lawyers and bribe judges." ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 1.
20. As one author points out, advertising and solicitation by attorneys were largely
unnecessary in late 19th century United States because "[a]t that time, most lawyers were
general practitioners in small communities and legal services were rendered in a one-to-
one relationship between people who knew each other in the community." ANDREWS,
supra note 4, at 1. See infra notes 24-30 for the formal justifications behind the prohibi-
tion of attorney advertising and solicitation.
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peared in 1908,2 1 and similar rules were in existence, in various
forms,22 until as late as 1976.23 The primary justification cited for
the total ban on advertising by attorneys was the need to protect
the public interest. 24 The American Bar Association Model Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") stated that the ban
21. This was the year in which the first Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted
by the American Bar Association ("ABA"). AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBITY ("ABA CANONS"). The ABA Canons were adopted in
an attempt to reverse the deteriorating standards of the American bar. This decline in
standards was the result of a widespread belief, in the later part of the 19th century, "that
professions were undemocratic and un-American." The control of the organized bar was
weakened by this attitude, and before the end of the century, the practice of law had been
reduced to the status of an ordinary trade. See Note, In Re R.M.J: Reassessing the
Extension of First Amendment Protections to Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U.L. REv.
729, 733-34 (1983).
Canon 27 provided in part: "The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom. . . is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications, or
interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." ABA CANONS No.
27 (1908), cited in DRINKER, supra note 16, at 215.
22. The ABA Canons were revised several times, but the ban on individual attorney
advertising and solicitation remained in force. The most notable revision of the ABA
Canons regarding advertising was the 1937 amendment permitting publication of profes-
sional cards in approved law lists. Later exceptions allowed recognized legal aid organi-
zations the freedom to promote their services. See Note, supra note 21, at 734 for a
general discussion of the evolution of the ABA Canons regarding advertising and solicita-
tion.
In 1969, the ABA Canons were redrafted into the American Bar Association Model
Code of Professional Responsibility ("MODEL CODE"). The Model Code is comprised of
three interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations (EC's), and Disciplinary Rules
(DR's). The Canons are statements of general concepts of professional conduct. The
EC's are aspirational objectives toward which the profession should strive. The DR's are
mandatory rules stating the minimum level of conduct which lawyers must meet.
MODEL CODE Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980). The rules governing the use
of advertising and solicitation are found in Canon 2 which states "A lawyer should assist
the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available." Id.
23. The rules prohibiting advertising appeared in Model Code DR 2-101. Until 1976,
DR 2-101(B) provided in part that:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or maga-
zine advertisement, radio or television announcements, display advertisements
in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize. . . others to do so in his behalf.
MODEL CODE DR 2-101(B) (1976).
T-e rules prohibiting solicitation appear in Model Code DR 2-103 and DR 2-104. DR
2-103 provides that: "A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recom-
mend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a lay
person who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." MODEL CODE
DR 2-103(A) (1980). DR 2-104 generally prohibits an attorney from accepting employ-
ment resulting from his unsolicited legal advice. MODEL CODE DR 2-104(A) (1980).
The Model Code was adopted into law by every state. See Note, supra note 21, at 729.
24. Regulating communication by lawyers was an attempt to prevent certain social
evils. For example, advertising of divorce services was prohibited because it was believed
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was necessary to protect the public from potentially deceptive ad-
vertisements25 and to prevent public confidence in the legal system
from being undermined by commercialization of the profession. 26
Another justification for prohibiting advertising was the belief that
it would stir up litigation and thereby adversely affect the adminis-
tration of justice.27 Similarly, the prohibition of attorney solicita-
tion was justified on three broad grounds: reducing the likelihood
of overreaching and undue influence on lay persons, 28 protecting
the privacy of individuals, 29 and avoiding situations where the law-
yer's judgment was clouded by his own pecuniary interest.30 The
legitimacy of these justifications regarding advertising began to be
challenged in the mid-1970's. 31
that such advertisements would encourage dissolution of marriage and the breakdown of
the family. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 1.
25. Model Code EC 2-9 stated that "[c]ompetitive advertising would encourage ex-
travagant, artful, self-laudatory brashness in seeking business and thus, could mislead the
layman." MODEL CODE EC 2-9 (1976) (amended 1980).
26. Model Code EC 2-9 also stated that "[competitive advertising] would inevitably
produce unrealistic expectations in particular cases and bring about distrust of the law
and lawyers. Thus, public confidence in our legal system would be impaired by such
advertisements of professional services." MODEL CODE EC 2-9 (1976) (amended 1980).
27. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375-77 (1977). Other justifications
supporting a total ban on attorney advertising were advanced in Bates, including the
inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising, id at 372-75; undesirable economic
effects, id. at 377-78; the adverse effect on quality of service, id. at 378; and the difficulties
of enforcement, id. at 379. The Court held, however, that none of these provided an
acceptable reason to prohibit all truthful advertising by attorneys. Id. See infra notes 46-
50 and accompanying text.
28. These dangers are due to the inherently private nature of solicitation which in-
volves direct contact between the attorney and the lay person. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. The effect is usually to give a one-sided presentation and to urge a
quick decision without providing an opportunity for third-parties to intervene. Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1977). See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Ohralik.
29. "[T]he overtures of an uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited individual sim-
ply because of their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's privacy." Ohralik,
436 U.S. at 465.
30. "A lawyer who engages in personal solicitation of clients may be inclined to
subordinate the best interests of the client to his own pecuniary interests. Even if unin-
tentionally, the lawyer's ability to evaluate the legal merit of his client's claims may falter
when the conclusion will affect the lawyer's income." Id. at 461 n.19.
31. On June 25, 1976, the Department of Justice initiated an antitrust suit against the
ABA alleging conspiracy to prohibit advertising. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 3. Joe
Sims, then special assistant to the Justice Department, pointed out: "The consumers of
legal services are just as entitled to the benefits of competition as are the consumers of
other services." Id. at 11. The suit was dropped in 1978 following major amendments to
the Model Code permitting advertising. Id. at 6; see also Note, Advertising, Solicitation
and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 18 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
Breaking Down the Barriers
One major source of the challenge against the ban on advertising
was the concern that information pertaining to legal services
should be made available to the public.32 Studies indicated that
83% of the population believed that public ignorance as to which
lawyers would be able to handle particular problems kept many
people from contacting any lawyer at all.3 3 It was also believed
that the public should be more informed about the law itself.34
Given the ever increasing amount of legal regulation over aspects
of daily life, many people did not always realize that they even had
a legal problem.3 5 Advertising by attorneys was one way to get this
much needed information to the public.
The other major reason that total prohibitions of attorney adver-
tising were breaking down was that advertising bans began to be
challenged as unconstitutional. 36  The notion that commercial
speech was not entitled to first amendment protection 37 was gradu-
ally being eroded. 31 In 1976, the United States Supreme Court set-
32. "A wide gap separates the need for legal services and its satisfaction, as numerous
studies reveal. . . [One] set of reasons is ignorance of the need for and the value of
legal services, and ignorance of where to find a dependable lawyer." Cheatham, Availa-
bility of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized
Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 438, 438 (1965).
33. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A
NATIONAL SURVEY 228 (1977). This study, carried out in 1973 and 1974 by the ABA
and the American Bar Foundation, surveyed 2000 adults in 33 states. ANDREWS, supra
note 4, at 1.
34. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 43-44.
35. Studies have shown that many people took no action when confronted with po-
tential legal problems. Thirty percent of those who had been seriously injured through
the fault of another took no action; 32% took no action against repossessions; 42% took
no action against constitutional infringements; 44% took no action against child injuries;
54% took no action against evictions; and 71% took no action against job discrimination.
ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 44.
36. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
37. In Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court held that
commercial speech was not entitled to the protection of the first amendment. Id. at 54.
In Valentine, the Court upheld a city ordinance which prohibited hand bill distribution,
stating that "The Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. Commercial speech has been defined as "[an]
expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience." Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. After Valentine, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court extended first amend-
ment protection to messages that were commercial in nature by characterizing them as
not purely commercial. See, e.g., Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); New
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tled the issue when it extended first amendment protection to
product advertising in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council.39
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court stated that
although the state retained the power to regulate commercial
speech," it could not completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about activity that was entirely
lawful." The Court, however, reserved the question as to whether
advertising by attorneys who render a variety of services rather
than dispense standardized products would also be covered by this
first amendment protection.42  That question was directly con-
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 415 (1945).
Although the Court relied on Valentine in deciding Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), which upheld an ordinance that
prohibited newspapers from using sex-designated want ads, the erosion of the Valentine
doctrine was evident in the dissenting opinions in Pittsburgh Press of Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Justice Stewart, Justice Douglas, and Justice Blackman. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S.
376, 393-404 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, Stewart, J., dissenting, Blackman, J., dissenting,
Douglas, J., dissenting).
The decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), holding that a state statute
prohibiting the advertisement of abortions violated the first amendment, further damaged
the Valentine doctrine. In Bigelow, the Court held that any advertisement which con-
veyed information of potential value and interest to the public should be entitled to first
amendment protection. Id. at 822. For a detailed discussion of the development of the
commercial speech doctrine, see Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1979); Comment, Attorney Direct
Mail Communication: The Koffler Commercial Speech Approach, 4 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 397, 403-06 (1982).
39. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, a consumer group challenged
a Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription price informa-
tion. Id. at 749-50. The consumers claimed they would benefit if the prohibition were
lifted and advertising were freely allowed. Id. at 753.
40. Id. at 770. The Court held that commercial speech may still be subject to regula-
tions as to time, place, and manner as long as these regulations leave open "ample alter-
native channels for communication of information." Id. at 771. Further, the Court
stated that commercial speech that is untruthful or promotes illegal activity is not pro-
tected. Id. at 771-72.
41. Id. at 773. The Court pointed out three justifications, based on the first amend-
ment, for permitting advertising of prescription drug prices. First, the Court stated that a
"purely economic" interest does not disqualify an advertiser from first amendment pro-
tection. Id. at 762. Second, the Court noted that consumers have a key interest in the
free flow of commercial information in order to make informed decisions. Id. at 763.
Finally, the Court stressed the role of advertising in the free enterprise system as a means
of promoting competition. Id. at 765.
42. "[T]he distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require
consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example. . . render
professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertis-
ing." (emphasis in original) Id. at 773 n.25.
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fronted one year later in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.43
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in Bates was whether
lawyers must be permitted to advertise the fees charged for "rou-
tine" legal services.' The appellants had been charged with violat-
ing Rule 2-101(B) of the Arizona Code of Professional
Responsibility because they had placed an advertisement for their
legal clinic in a newspaper.4 5 The Court examined the state inter-
ests advanced by the respondents in support of the restriction, such
as preventing adverse effects on professionalism and the adminis-
tration of justice and protecting the public from the inherently mis-
leading nature of attorney advertising,4 6 and concluded that none
were sufficient to justify a blanket suppression of all attorney ad-
vertising.47 In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the
overwhelming public need for information concerning the nature
and availability of legal services. 48 The Court viewed legal adver-
tising as a way of getting this information to the public.4 9 Thus,
the Court held that a state cannot proscribe truthful attorney
newspaper advertising concerning the terms and availability of
routine legal services.50
43. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
44. Id. at 354. The services to which the appellant's advertisement applied were un-
contested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and name
changes. Id.
45. Id. at 354-55. The rule provided in pertinent part that "a lawyer shall not publi-
cize himself. . .as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or
television announcements ... or other means of commercial publicity." ARIZONA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B), incorporated in ARIZ. CT. R.
29(a), 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26 (Supp. 1984).
46. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-77. Other state interests advanced by the respondents in-
cluded preventing undesirable economic effects, preventing adverse effects on the quality
of service, and the difficulties of enforcement. Id. at 377-79. See supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text.
47. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379. Much of the Court's reasoning in reaching this conclusion
was taken from Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), see supra note 40 and
accompanying text. The Court in Bates acknowledged this, stating: "We have set out
this detailed summary of the Pharmacy opinion because the conclusion that Arizona's
disciplinary rule is violative of the First Amendment might be said to flow a fortiori from
it." Bates, 433 U.S. at 365.
48. Bates, 433 U.S. at 370-77. The Court cited surveys indicating that legal services
were underutiiized by the middle 70% of the population due to a fear of the cost and an
inability to locate a suitable lawyer. Id. at 370 nn. 22-23, 376 n.33. See supra notes 33-35
and accompanying text.
49. "[C]ommercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and
prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system." Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
50. Id. at 384. For a detailed analysis of the Court's decision, see The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 198-208 (1977); Comment, Lawyer Advertising:
The Practical Effects of Bates, 1 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 349 (1978).
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The Bates Court, however, did not eliminate all restrictions on
attorney advertising. The states were still permitted to regulate ad-
vertising by lawyers in an effort to assure accuracy and reliability.5
One of the recommendations made by the Court was the continued
prohibition of advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading,52
and of in-person solicitation.5 3
One year after Bates, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
individual attorney solicitation 54 in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation,5 a case that highlights the differences between advertising
and solicitation. In this case, the appellant, after learning that two
51. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. "[T]he public and private benefits from commercial
speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reliability." Id.
52. Id. at 383. The Court also suggested prohibiting claims as to quality of service
and improper advertising. The Court also noted that advertising by electronic broadcast
media needed special consideration. Id. at 383-84.
53. Id. at 384. As one author pointed out, "It is not clear whether the Court consid-
ered direct-mail communications as a form of advertising or solicitation, if indeed the
issue was contemplated at all." Note, Direct Mail Solicitation By Attorneys: Bates to
R.M.J., 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1041, 1048 n.47 (1982). The Court also recommended the
use of warnings or disclaimers. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. Additionally, the Court stated
that reasonable restrictions upon the time, place, and manner of advertising could be
imposed. Id.
Since the Supreme Court "opened the door to legal advertising" in Bates, the amount
of money spent on television advertising alone has increased from $81,344 in 1977 to
$17.8 million in 1983. In 1984, expenditures for legal advertising on television increased
another 58%. Middleton, TVAd Spending Shows Sharp Rise, Nat'l L.J., March 25, 1985,
at 3. See generally King, What Works, What Doesn't in Advertising, 71 A.B.A. J. 54
(April, 1985).
54. Earlier cases concerning attorney solicitation all involved group solicitation. In
these cases, the solicitation was afforded constitutional protection because of the collec-
tive activity involved. The major group solicitation cases are United Transp. Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (collective activity by the union, including rec-
ommendation of attorneys undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fun-
damental right within the protection of the first amendment); UMW, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (in view of first amendment rights, a union cannot be
prohibited from employing an attorney on salary to pursue Workman's compensation
claims); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964) (union members have first amendment right to receive a recommendation from
union legal department on selection of an attorney, and those attorneys who accept such
work are exercising constitutional rights which the state may not abridge); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (state statute prohibiting solicitation as applied to the
NAACP unconstitutionally inhibited freedom of speech and association). See Comment,
supra note 38, at 406-09 for a discussion of the constitutional history of solicitation.
55. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The Court decided another case involving individual attor-
ney solicitation on the same day, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). These two cases can
be viewed as two extremes. The solicitation involved in Primus was for the purpose of
engaging in litigation as a form of political expression and without motive for pecuniary
gain. In Primus, mothers on welfare were solicited to engage in litigation seeking to
enjoin a state policy of involuntary sterilization of women on public assistance. The
Court held that this type of solicitation is afforded complete constitutional protection. Id.
at 439. At the other extreme is the type of "ambulance chasing" that was present in
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young women had been victims of an auto accident, actively pur-
sued the two until he succeeded in obtaining both as clients on a
contingent fee basis.5 6 Both women later discharged him and filed a
grievance charging him with solicitation in violation of the state
code of ethics.5 7
The Court held that this type of commercial speech was not enti-
tled to the same constitutional protection as that seen in Bates. 8
The Court acknowledged that both advertising and solicitation
serve the function of providing information about legal services; 59
however, the Court pointed out that there are significant differ-
ences between the two." First, advertisements do not require the
recipient to make an immediate decision.6' Solicitation, on the
other hand, exerts pressure to make a speedy response before the
recipient has had time to reflect.62 Second, unlike advertisements
which are in the public view, solicitation does not allow for inter-
vention by supervisory authorities.63
Because of these differences between advertising and solicitation,
the Court noted that the state interests in proscribing solicitation
are stronger. 64 The state interests referred to include protecting
consumers and regulating commercial transactions;65 maintaining
standards among members of licensed professions; 66 and protecting
the public from such dangers as overreaching and undue influence,
invasion of privacy, and the clouding of a lawyer's judgment by
pecuniary self-interests.67 The Court held that the state could
therefore constitutionally prohibit solicitation in circumstances
likely to pose these dangers.68
Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (1977). This kind of solicitation is completely proscribed. Id. at
449.
56. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 450-51.
57. Id. at 453.
58. In-person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business
transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component. While
this does not remove the speech from the protection of the First Amendment, as
was held in Bates and Virginia Pharmacy, it lowers the level of appropriate
judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 457.
59. Id. at 457-58.
60. Id, at 457.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 455.
65. Id. at 460.
66. Id. The state has a great interest in regulating lawyers who serve as officers of the
court and aid in the "primary governmental function" of administering justice. Id.
67. Id. at 461.
68. Id. at 449.
[Vol. 16
1985] Direct Mailings
The decisions in Bates and Ohralik helped the states clarify the
two ends of the spectrum concerning communications between at-
torneys and potential clients. 69 Truthful newspaper advertising re-
garding the terms and availability of routine legal services could no
longer be prohibited."° In-person solicitation involving the poten-
tial for overreaching, however, could be absolutely proscribed.7 '
In response to these pronouncements by the Supreme Court, the
states began amending their codes of professional ethics to comply
with these cases and to attempt to accommodate the many types of
communications that fell between the two extremes.72
State Code Revisions After Bates
In enacting regulations relating to direct mailings, the states
were guided by the two Draft Proposals, Proposals A and B, sug-
gested by the American Bar Association ("ABA").7 3  Eighteen
states74 and the District of Columbia adopted Proposal B, which
can be characterized as the directive approach. 7  This proposal
permits lawyers to advertise any information that is not false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive.76 The majority of the states,
69. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
70. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
71. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449; see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
72. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia amended their advertising rules
following the decision in Bates. The two states that did not do so are Hawaii and Mon-
tana. Texas merely suspended it rules to the extent they conflict with Bates. ANDREWS,
supra note 4, at 43, 138, 141, and 146.
73. The Draft Proposals were the product of the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Adver-
tising. The Task Force was established on June 7, 1977, shortly before the decision was
handed down in Bates. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 91. Both Proposals are reprinted at
97-134.
74. These states include California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. ANDREWS, supra note 4,
Appendix III, at 135-45. The reference to Illinois here is to the Code of the Illinois State
Bar Association. This is not the official code for Illinois. See infra note 85 and accompa-
nying text.
75. See ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 93 (quoting from the Report to the Board of
Governors of the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising).
76. Id. This directive approach is also in the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT (1983) ("MODEL RULES"). The newer Model Rules offer a less restrictive ap-
proach to advertising than does the older Model Code, Andrews, The Model Rules and
Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808, 808 (1982). The Model Rules take the directive approach
to lawyer advertising. Generally this means that lawyers may include any information in
their advertisements as long as it is not false or misleading. This approach differs from
that taken in the Model Code which provides a limited list of the items of information
that may be included in an advertisement. See infra note 78. Rule 7.1 of the Model
Rules contains the general guideline that "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." MODEL RULES Rule 7.1
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and the ABA itself,77 adopted Proposal A, known as the regulatory
approach.
Under the regulatory approach, permissible advertising is re-
stricted to certain categories of information or to certain specified
language.7  The states differ as to the kind of information that can
be disclosed79 and as to the form of media that can be used. s°
(1983). Rule 7.2 lists the media through which lawyers may advertise. This rule states
that "subject to the requirements of rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through
public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodi-
cal, outdoor, radio or television, or through written communication not involving solici-
tation as defined in rule 7.3." MODEL RULES Rule 7.2 (1983). Rule 7.3 governs the
practice of direct contact with prospective clients. Rule 7.3 provides:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail,
in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by tele-
phone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication di-
rected to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or
advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal
services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are
so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
MODEL RULES Rule 7.3.
The ABA adopted the Model Rules on August 2, 1983. Since then, only two states,
Arizona and New Jersey, have adopted the ABA Model Rules. See generally Andrews,
The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808-11 (July 1982).
Of the states that adopted Proposal B, nine seem to permit the use of direct mailings.
These are California, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. ANDREWS, supra note 4, Appendix III at
135-45. The various state rules regarding direct mailings are not always clear, however.
The numbers used here "reflect the bias of giving.., terms in the state advertising rules
the broadest interpretation possible." Id. at 135.
77. The ABA adopted Proposal A in August of 1977. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 6.
Twenty-nine states also adopted this approach. These states include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Ver-
mont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. Appendix III at 135-45.
78. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 92. The categories of information include basic bio-
graphical information and limited fee information. The Model Code, for example, listed
25 categories of permissible information in DR 2-101(B). This rule permitted a lawyer to
publish or broadcast the following information: name, address, and telephone number;
field of law practice; date and place of birth; date and place of admission to bar; schools
attended; public offices; military service; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; bar
association uembership; membership in legal fraternity or society; technical and profes-
sional licenses; membership in scientific, technical, or professional associations; foreign
language ability; bank references; names of regularly represented clients; prepaid or
group legal services programs; credit plans; office hours; initial consultation fee; availabil-
ity of written fee schedule; contingent fee rates; range of fees for services; hourly rate; and
fixed fee for specific legal services. MODEL CODE DR 2-101(B) (1980).
79. For example, Rhode Island does not permit a lawyer to include biographical in-
formation and Connecticut does not permit advertising of hourly rates. Andrews, supra
note 76, at 809.
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Under the version of Proposal A adopted by the ABA, general
mailings are prohibited, but professional announcement cards can
be mailed to lawyers, clients, friends, and relatives.81 An attorney
is further prohibited from recommending employment of himself
to a lay person, 2 or from accepting employment resulting from his
in-person, unsolicited advice.83 In addition, the rules prohibit an
attorney from holding himself out publicly as a specialist.8 4
Illinois 5 modeled its Code of Professional Responsibility after
the Model Code 86 and thus generally followed the regulatory ap-
proach.87 As originally adopted, the Illinois Code was ambiguous
in its treatment of direct mailings.8 While mailings were neither
80. Various jurisdictions restrict the use of direct mailings, television advertisements,
hand bills, and billboards. For a chart pointing out the various approaches, see AN-
DREWS, supra note 4, at 135-46.
81. "A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed association or
addresses . . . may be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and
relatives. It shall not state biographical data except to the extent reasonably necessary to
identify the lawyer .. " MODEL CODE DR 2-102(A)(2) (1980); see also ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 301 (1961) (mailing announcements
to person with whom the attorney had no professional relations or dealings is prohibited).
82. "A lawyer shall not . . . recommend employment as a private practitioner, of
himself. . . to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer." MODEL CODE DR 2-103(A) (1980); see also ABA Comm. on Professional Eth-
ics and Grievances, Formal Op. 307 (1962) (lawyer may not seek from persons not his
clients the opportunity to perform a legal checkup).
83. "A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from
that advice...." MODEL CODE DR 2-104(A) (1980).
84. "A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist.... ".MODEL
CODE DR 2-105(A) (1980). Exceptions to this rule are designations of "Patent Attor-
ney" or other exceptions authorized by the states. Id.
85. The Illinois Supreme Court did not adopt an official code of ethical rules until
June 3, 1980. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). Prior
to this, it had been established by case law that the Code of the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion was to be used as a guideline. In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567, 571, 363 N.E.2d 845, 847
(1977).
86. The Committee on Professional Responsibility also considered the codes of the
Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations in developing the new Illinois Code. TRANS-
MITTAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1978).
87. The categories of information listed in the Illinois Code are more generalized
than those of the Model Code. They are the name of the lawyer; the address and phone
number; educational or other background; basis on which fees are determined and avail-
able credit; description of types of legal matters which will be accepted; foreign language
ability; names of references and regularly represented clients. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-
101(a) (1980). The Illinois Code also includes an open-ended provision that permits the
inclusion of information about the lawyer which a reasonable person might find relevant
in deciding whether to seek the lawyer's services. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-101(a)(8)
(1980).
88. See Braverman, Direct Mailing-Advertising? Solicitation? Either? 71 ILL. B.J.
544, 544 (May 1983).
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specifically permitted nor expressly prohibited, there were provi-
sions of the code which could be interpreted either way. 9 As a
result, attorneys who wished to use mailings to advertise were un-
derstandably confused. 90
Under the earlier version of Rule 2-103, direct mailings seemed
to be prohibited as a form of solicitation.91 In the provision, the
Illinois Code stated that a lawyer could not recommend or solicit
employment of himself by "private communications. ' 92 Private
communications are defined in the Illinois Code as personal con-
tact between a lawyer and an individual lay person directly, by tel-
ephone, or by "written communication." 93 Under Illinois Code
Rule 2-101, however, mailings seemed to be allowed as a method of
advertising.94 This rule permits a lawyer to advertise through any
commercial publicity or "other form of communication.'' 5 Direct
mailings were not specifically mentioned.96
In evaluating whether Rule 2-103 or 2-101 applied to a particu-
lar mailing, the Illinois Ethics Committee generally focused on two
issues: first, whether there were pecuniary goals motivating the
mailings; and second, whether they were "private," meaning
targeted. 97 If both of these questions were answered affirmatively,
the mailings were generally prohibited. 98 A mailing could, how-
89. The two conflicting provisions were Illinois Code Rule 2-101 (Publicity and Ad-
vertising) and Illinois Code Rule 2-103 (Private Communication Recommending or
Soliciting Professional Employment). See infra notes 91-94.
90. See infra notes 97-102.
91. Illinois Code Rule 2-103(a) provided in part that "A lawyer shall not by private
communication. . . recommend or solicit employment of himself. . . for pecuniary gain
or other benefit and shall not for that purpose initiate contact with a prospective client."
ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(a) (1980).
92. Id.
93. Illinois Code Rule 2-103(e) provides in pertinent part that " 'Private communica-
tion' . . . shall include personal contact between a lawyer and an individual lay person,
directly or by telephone, and may include other in-person and written communications."
ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(e) (1980).
94. Illinois Code Rule 2-101 provides in part that "[a] lawyer may publicize himself
as a lawyer through any commercial publicity or other form of public communication"
provided that such communication meets all the conditions." ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-101
(1980).
95. Id.
96. illinois Code Rule 2-i0i provides that public communications include the follow-
ing: "any newspaper, magazine, telephone directory, radio, television, or other advertis-
ing." ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-101 (1980).
97. See Illinois State Bar Association, Formal Op. 853 (Nov. 8, 1983), reprinted in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3018 (1984) (letters
mailed to targeted groups of consumers recommending that they file suit are prohibited).
"The proposed communications are ones which solicit professional employment. Under
Rule 2-103(a), such a communication is unethical if 'private'." Id.
98. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Association, Formal Op. 832 (Jan. 4, 1984), reprinted
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ever, be targeted if there were no pecuniary motivations,99 or vice
versa. °0 Recognizing the ambiguity in this area, the Illinois State
Bar Association Guidelines advised caution in the use of direct
mailings. 10' Thus, the revisions of the Illinois Code made in light
of Bates0 2 left many questions unanswered. The next Supreme
Court case on the issue of attorney advertising, In re R.MJ. ,103
provided some answers.
In Re R.MJ.
In In re R.MJ., the Supreme Court was called upon to examine
the constitutionality of Missouri's code revisions."o The appellant
in In re R.MJ., a Missouri attorney, wanted to announce the open-
ing of his new law office. To do so, he mailed professional an-
nouncement cards to a selected list of addressees and placed
several advertisements in local newspapers. 0 5 As a result of these
actions, he was charged with unprofessional conduct for violating
the Missouri rules governing attorney advertising.'0 6 The mailings
had been sent to persons other than lawyers, clients, relatives, and
friends, 0 7 and the advertisements included information not specifi-
in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3016 (1984) (no
direct mail solicitation targeted to newcomers in the area); Illinois State Bar Association,
Formal Op. 814 (Oct. 21, 1983), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3015 (1984) (mailing newsletters to targeted nonlawyers when
newsletters contain offers of solicitation is prohibited).
99. See Illinois State Bar Association, Formal Op. 727 (April 30, 1981), reprinted in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3007 (1984) (law-
yers may send targeted letters offering to conduct seminars on current legal problems
because the letters do not solicit employment).
100. See Illinois State Bar Association, Formal Op. 702 (Nov. 4, 1980), reprinted in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:3005 (1984) (a law-
yer may publicize himself under Rule 2-101 by means of letters sent to all postal patrons
in the community).
101. "While direct mail is nowhere expressly banned in the Code, it remains a unique
and potentially troublesome medium which should only be used with greatest care and
reservation." Moenning, ISBA Special Committee Guidelines For Individual Lawyer Ad-
vertising, 71 ILL. B.J. 404, 408 (March 1983).
102. Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
103. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1981).
104. In amending its rules on lawyer advertising, Missouri followed the regulatory
approach. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. Lawyer advertising was per-
mitted in Missouri but was restricted to 10 categories of information, In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. at 194, and to certain specified language for listing areas of practice, id. at 195.
General mailings were not allowed; only announcement cards could be mailed and only
to lawyers, clients, friends, and relatives. Id. at 196.
105. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 196-97.
106. Id. at 194-98.
107. Id. at 198; see supra note 104.
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cally permitted by the state code. 0 8  The appellant argued that
Missouri's restrictions upon advertising were unconstitutional
under the first amendment.0 9
The Supreme Court began by summarizing the present status of
commercial speech doctrine as applied to advertising by profes-
sionals." ° The Court stated that truthful advertising related to
lawful activities was entitled to first amendment protection, but
misleading advertising could be entirely prohibited."' The Court
also noted that the state retains some authority to regulate commu-
nications that are not misleading." 2 In order to do so, however,
the state must assert a substantial interest, and the regulation may
be no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further those
interests." 3 In applying this doctrine to lawyer advertising specifi-
cally, the Court expanded the narrow holding of Bates"4 and put
forth a workable standard" 5 for evaluating the regulation of attor-
ney advertising." 6
Applying this standard to the facts in In re R.MJ., the Court
108. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 198.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 203-04.
111. Id. at 203.
112. Id.
113. Id. This language is essentially that of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court held that a
statute purporting to advance energy conservation by banning advertising to promote the
use of electricity violated the first amendment. In reaching this result, the Court applied
a four-part analysis:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. . . . [T]o come within that provision, it at least must con-
cern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
Id. at 566.
The standard employed in this analysis appears to be analogous to the Court's equal
protection intermediate scrutiny standard. The prior standard associated with first
amendment cases was strict scrutiny. Applying an intermediate standard to commercial
speech cases results in "first amendment protection that is quantitatively less than that
accorded to pnlitinal ,pee(h and assoc'iatnani fredAnms intdr a ctstiny, stan-
dards." Comment, supra note 38, at 406.
114. See supra notes 50-54 and the accompanying text.
115. This standard can be labeled as a substantial state interest standard whereby the
state must demonstrate a substantial interest to support any proscription on commercial
speech. For a discussion of this standard, see Whitman & Stoltenberg, The Present Con-
stitutional Status of Lawyer Advertising: Theoretical & Practical Implications of In Re
R.M.J., 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445, 469-71 (1983).
116. Id. at 467-71, 482-83.
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examined Missouri's restrictions of the types of information that
could be included in an advertisement."' The Court held that
since the information published in the appellant's advertisements
was not misleading on its face and since the state had not suggested
a substantial interest promoted by its restriction, the restriction
was invalid. 1 ' Further, the Court held that the absolute prohibi-
tion of mailings to the general public was too broad. 119 Although
the Court acknowledged that mailings may be more difficult to su-
pervise than newspapers, it held that there were less restrictive
ways to supervise such mailings short of an absolute prohibition.12
The Supreme Court thus opened the way for the practice of general
direct mailings to persons other than lawyers, clients, relatives, and
friends. 121
STATE TREATMENT OF DIRECT MAIL SOLICITATION
After the decision in In re R.MJ., it was clear that mailings to
the general public could not be absolutely prohibited.' 22 The Court
in In re R.MJ. did not address, however, whether state interests
exist which would justify more stringent regulations of direct mail-
ings than those imposed on traditional advertising.'23 Conse-
quently, resolution of this issue was left to the states. 124  The
manner in which states have tried to resolve the issue of direct
117. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 204-05.
118. Id. at 205.
119. Id. at 206.
120. The Court suggested that reasonable supervision could be exercised by requiring
a filing of a copy of all general mailings with a regulatory board. Id. The Court also
suggested that lawyers could be required to stamp "This is an Advertisement" on the
envelope. Id. at 206 n.20.
121. See generally Whitman & Stoltenberg, supra note 115; Note, Attorney's Ex-
panding Right to Advertise Under the First Amendment: In Re R.M.J., 26 How. L.J. 281
(1983).
122. See supra note 119.
123. The Court merely stated that neither difficulties of supervision nor privacy inter-
ests were sufficient to justify an absolute prohibition on mailings. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
at 206 n.20, 207. The Court has denied certiorari in three cases involving direct mail
communication with prospective clients for pecuniary gain. Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270
Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), (advertising that mentions broad areas of legal services
without distinguishing fees and which is distributed through a discount coupon mailing is
potentially deceptive and therefore properly subject to proscription); cert. denied, 450
U.S. 966 (1981); In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980)
(direct mail solicitation of potential real estate clients is protected commercial speech
which may be regulated but not proscribed), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981); Matter of
Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984) (blanket prohibi-
tion of mail solicitation of accident victims violates first amendment), cert. denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3867 (U.S. June 10, 1985) (No. 84-1120).
124. See infra notes 125-27.
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mailings can be discussed and analyzed in terms of two broad
approaches.
The first approach allows direct mail solicitation to be targeted
to specific individuals who are considering legal action. 125  The
only restriction placed on such mailings is that they must not be
deceptive. 126 The second approach permits direct mailings to be
targeted to individuals with a general interest in the lawyer's serv-
ices, but not to those with identified legal needs. 127  Illinois is
among the states that have adopted the latter approach. 128
The most recent case applying the first approach is Matter of
Von Wiegen. 129 This New York decision exemplifies the liberal
treatment of direct mailings.130 In Von Wiegen, a personal injury
attorney sent letters advertising his services to 250 persons injured
in the 1981 collapse of a skywalk at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in
125. See, e.g., Spencer v. Honorable Justice of Supreme Court of Pa., 579 F. Supp.
880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (mailings targeted to owners of aircraft or computers who have a
legal problem are constitutionally protected); Matter of Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470
N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984) (blanket prohibition of mail solicitation of accident
victims violates first amendment), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3869 (U.S. June 10, 1985)
(No. 84-1120); Connecticut State Bar, Informal Op. 81-16, (April 10, 1981), reprinted in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:2054 (1984) (real
estate attorney may target mailings to property owners who are trying to sell their
homes); Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-
F-78 (Oct. 17, 1984), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 801:8114 (1985) (lawyers may target mailings to defaulting mortgagors whose
homes are advertised for foreclosure).
126. See, e.g., Spencer, 579 F. Supp. at 889; Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 173, 470
N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
127. See, e.g., California State Bar, Formal Op. 1980-54, (1980), reprinted in ABA/
BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:1601 (1984) (attorney may
send unsolicited letters to potential business clients as long as no reference is made to any
specific case or matter involving the recipient); Maryland State Bar, Formal Op. 81-21
(Feb. 16, 1981), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT 801:4307 (1984) (mailings to groups of persons whose characteristics suggest that
they may be in need of legal services are permissible); Michigan State Bar, Formal Op.
CI-573 (Oct. 13, 1980), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 801:4812 (1984) (advertising legal services by mail is permissible only when it
is generalized and not tailored to specific needs of individual recipients); Wisconsin State
Bar, Op. E-84-13 (Sept. 1984), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 801:9113 (1985) (a lawyer may not target any mail advertising to po-
tentnli c1llpntq with nn i lntifi d need for lega ,ir, '
128. See ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b) (amended 1984) set forth supra note 14.
129. 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert. denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3869 (U.S. June 10, 1985) (No. 84-1120).
130. "[The] ruling makes New York one of the nation's most permissive states in
allowing contact between the bar and individuals who specifically may be considering
legal action." Kaplan, N. Y Court OKs Direct Mail to Possible Clients, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5,
1984, at 8; see also N. Y Lawyers May Solicit Accident Victims by Mail, 71 A.B.A. J. 117
(Feb. 1985).
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Kansas City, Missouri. 3' As a consequence of these mailings, he
was charged with engaging in direct mail solicitation in violation of
the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, 32 and sus-
pended from practice for six months. 3 3 The attorney alleged that
the prohibition of direct mail solicitation abridged his constitu-
tional right to free speech. 134
The court began by classifying the state restriction as content
based, 35 rather than one relating to the time, place, or manner of
expression.136 As such, 1 3 the court stated that the restriction had
to be judged by a structured four-part analysis. 38 First, the court
found that direct mail solicitation of accident victims was entitled
to constitutional protection because it did not relate to illegal activ-
ity nor was it inherently misleading. 39 Second, the court examined
the state interests sought to be protected and rejected the follow-
ing: overcommercialization of the legal profession; invasion of pri-
vacy and risk of undue pressure; and stirring up litigation.4° The
131. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 166, 470 N.E.2d at 839, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
132. Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42. He was also charged with
employing deception and misrepresentation in the letters, and in an unrelated incident,
with using a prohibited tradename. Id.
133. Id. at 166, 470 N.E.2d at 839, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
134. Id.
135. "[T]he state seeks to regulate respondent's letter, . . because of the subject
matter of the communication-the fact that respondent seeks to be retained to represent
accident victims. . . . As such, the regulation is plainly content based." Id. at 172, 470
N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
136. To be a time, place, or manner restriction, the restriction can determine how,
when or where speech is permitted, but it may only do so without reference to the subject
matter or content of the speech. Id. at 171-72, 470 N.E.2d at 842, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
These types of restrictions are valid if reasonable and rationally related to legitimate state
interests. Id.
137. Content restrictions are valid only if substantial state interests are involved and
then the regulation may go no further than necessary to serve that interest. Id. For a
more detailed discussion of the two types of restrictions and their constitutional conse-
quences, see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cox v. Lou, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
138. Von Weigen, 63 N.Y.2d at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45; see also
supra note 113.
139. The court correctly noted that there is no constitutional right to disseminate
false or misleading information. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 45. In spite of the fact that the court held the respondent's letters to be
misleading in this case, id. at 176, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47, the court stated
that this type of information could be presented in a non-deceptive way. Thus, absolute
prohibition is unwarranted. Id. at 173-76, 470 N.E.2d at 843-45, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45-47.
140. The court stated that overcommercialization is controlled by "advertising stan-
dards" contained in another provision of the New York code. Id. at 174-75, 470 N.E.2d
at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46. Regarding invasion of privacy, the court stated that recipi-
ents could avoid the intrusion by throwing the letter away. Id. Finally, the court stated
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only justification deemed sufficient to support a ban was the danger
of deception.' 4 ' The court then combined the third part of the
analysis, requiring that the regulation directly advance the interest,
with the fourth part, requiring that the regulation be no more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve that interest, and found that the
danger of deception could be obviated by a lesser restriction than a
total ban.'42 Accordingly, the court held that the blanket prohibi-
tion of mail solicitation of accident victims, people with identified
legal needs, violates lawyers' rights of expression under the first
and fourteenth amendments. 14 3
The Illinois Approach: Amended Rule 2-103
In contrast to the approach taken in New York, Illinois has
amended Rule 2-103'44 to permit attorneys to target mailings to
persons who might, in general, find the attorneys' services to be
useful, but not to those known to require such services in a specific
matter. 1 45 This restriction is considered as necessary to distinguish
the permitted mailings from solicitation by private communication,
which remains prohibited. ' 46 The requirement that the representa-
tions be general in character, as opposed to being tailored to a spe-
cific occurrence, is to make the mailings more closely resemble
permissible advertising. 14 7 In this way, the dangers of abuse associ-
that although mailings may instigate lawsuits, "it is better to address... wrongs than to
suffer in silence." Id.
141. Id. at 175, 470 N.Y.2d at 844-45, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
142. The court suggested that filing the letters would help "sanitize" the statements
made therein. Id. at 175, 470 N.Y.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
143. Id. at 170, 470 N.Y.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
144. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b) (amended 1984), reprinted supra note 14. The
comments following the rule indicate that the rule was amended in response to the deci-
sion in In re R.M.J. that the prohibition of general public mailings would not withstand
first amendment attack. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103 committee comments (amended
1984). The amendment also eliminates the ambiguity that surrounded direct mailings
under the old rule. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
145. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b)(2) (amended 1984).
146. Id. Section (a) of Rule 2-103 provides that "A lawyer shall not by private com-
munication, except as provided in (b) below, directly or through a representative, recom-
mend or solicit employment of himself. . . for pecuniary gain or other benefit and shall
not for that purpose initiate contact with a prospective client." The comments following
the rule state that the solicitation prohibited by this section is that which "connotes a
'private' communication targeted at a person or category of persons known by the lawyer
to have an immediate, potential need for legal services." ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103
committee comments (amended 1984).
147. The comments state:
The representations made in such mailings will be general rather than tailored
to a specific matter or event, will not have the same danger of abuse as would
mailings addressed to persons whom the lawyer knows to have a particular mat-
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ated with solicitation are avoided. 148
The rule imposes other requirements on the use of direct mail-
ings that are designed to reduce the potential for abuse. First, the
letters and the envelopes containing them must be plainly labeled
as advertising material.'49 Second, a copy of the mailing, along
with a list of those to whom it was sent, must be filed with the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC")
within 30 days. 50 Finally, and more generally, the mailings are
subject to the same requirements as are public communications
under Illinois Code Rule 2-101.11' As a result, their content is
limited to the same generalized categories of information, 5 2 they
must be true, complete, and not misleading,' and they must be
made in a direct, dignified, and readily comprehensible manner. 114
Although these safeguards appear to be consistent with the policy
concerns surrounding direct mailings'55 and the holding of the
Supreme Court decision in In re R.MJ.,156 the propriety of the
newly adopted Illinois Rule is currently being challenged in the
federal district court in Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disci-
ter or problem requiring legal services, and will therefore more closely resemble
permissive advertising than prohibited solicitation.
ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103 committee comments (amended 1984).
148. Id.
149. Illinois Code Rule 2-103(b)(2) provides that in order for an attorney to initiate
contact with prospective clients via direct mailings, "such letters and circulars and the
envelopes containing them [must be] plainly labeled as advertising material." ILLINOIS
CODE Rule 2-103(b)(2) (amended 1984).
150. "A copy of any written private communication recommending or soliciting pro-
fessional employment, together with the name and address of each person to whom the
communication is sent, shall be filed with the [ARDC] within thirty days after it is sent."
Id. See Chicago Bar Association, Op. 84-09 (May 29, 1984) (copies of the mailings need
not be sent to the ARDC if they do not initiate contact, or if they are addressed to
relatives, close friends, or others whom the lawyer may ethically solicit in person).
151. This requirement appears in Illinois Code Rule 2-103(c)(4) which provides that
"In no event may a lawyer initiate contact with a prospective client if... (4) the com-
munication would be in violation of Rule 2-101 if it were a public communication." ILLI-
NOIS CODE Rule 2-103(c)(4) (amended 1984). Other circumstances in which the lawyer
is absolutely prohibited from initiating contact are where the lawyer reasonably should
know that the physical, emotional, or mental state of the person solicited is such that the
person could not exercise reasonable judgment ..." ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(c)(1)
(1980); where the person "has made known a desire not to receive" any communication,
ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(c)(2) (1980); and where the solicitation involves coercion,
duress, or harassment, ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(c)(3) (1980).
152. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-101(a) (1980); see supra note 87.
153. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-101(b) (1980). "Such communication shall contain all
information necessary to make the communication not misleading and shall not contain
any false or misleading statement or otherwise operate to deceive." Id.
154. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-101(c) (1980).
155. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
156. In re RMJ, 455 U.S. at 203; see supra text accompanying note 113.
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plinary Commission."'
Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
The complaint in Adams was filed by several bankruptcy attor-
neys who challenged Rule 2-103 on the grounds that it violated
their rights to freedom of speech, due process, and equal protec-
tion."s8 The attorneys had been mailing brochures and letters to
targeted groups with specific legal needs, such as people against
whom foreclosure actions had recently been filed.' 59 The mailings
urged the recipients to contact an attorney in order to be advised of
their legal rights and options.' 6° They also contained recommen-
dations that the recipients contact their office if they did not al-
ready have an attorney.1 61 The lawyers maintained that they had
been making such mailings ever since the decision in In re
R.MJ. ,62 relying on the Court's holding that direct mailings could
not be absolutely prohibited. 63 They further alleged that they had
been able to make these mailings under the prior Illinois rule'64 but
would be prohibited from doing so under the new rule.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
that the new rule unconstitutionally violated their right to free
speech. 1 65 The plaintiffs relied on two decisions from other states,
Koffler v. Joint Bar Association6 6 and Spencer v. Justices of the
157. No. 84-3548 (N.D. Ill., filed April 25, 1984). See generally ABA/BNA LAW-
YERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Current Reports 192 (1984).
158. Plaintiff's Complaint at par. 7 & 22, Adams v. ARDC, No. 84-3548, (N.D. Ill.,
filed April 25, 1984); see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
159. Plaintiff's Complaint at pars. 12, 13, 14, & 15, Adams v. ARDC, No. 84-3548,
(N.D. Ill., filed April 25, 1984). Copies of the mailings in question were attached to the
complaint.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at pars. 13, 14, & 15. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
163. See supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
164. Plaintiff's Complaint at par. 14, Adams v. ARDC, No. 84-3548, (N.D. Ill., filed
April 25, 1984). See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
treatment of direct mailings in Illinois prior to the amendment of Rule 2-103.
165. Plaintiff's Complaint, at par. 22(a), Adams v. ARDC, No. 84-3548 (N.D. Ill.,
filed April 25, 1984). The plaintiffs also alleged that the rule violates "their right to due
piocess and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment in that they are prohibited
from advertising by direct mailing to the group they might expect to serve, whereas other
lawyers can advertise by direct mailing to special interest groups under the Amended
Rule, without a rational basis for distinction." Id. at par. 22(b).
The fourteenth amendment states in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
166. 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1026 (1981). The defendant had mailed 7500 letters to individual property owners solic-
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 67 to support their position that mail-
ings targeted to those with specific needs can be regulated with a
lesser restriction than a total ban. The plaintiffs also sought to en-
join the ARDC from enforcing the amended rule against them and
were successful in this request. 68
Soon after this action was commenced, the ARDC filed a com-
plaint for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court of Illinois 69
seeking a ruling that Rule 2-103 is a constitutional regulation of
commercial speech by attorneys. 70 Thereafter, the plaintiffs in the
original action filed a petition for removal of this state action to the
federal court.' 71 The ARDC sought to remand the action to the
state court but was not successful. 7 2 Currently, these actions are
still pending, 7 3 and thus, the question of whether Illinois attorneys
iting them to use his services in selling their property and informing them of his closing
fee. The court held that this type of direct mailing could be regulated but not proscribed.
Id. at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74. The court went on to apply the
four-part commercial speech analysis, and concluded that the mailings here were permis-
sible. Id. at 147-50, 412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876-78; see infra notes 210-12
and accompanying text.
167. 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania attorney,
wanted to send information about his credentials in aviation and computer law to
targeted groups of the population (aircraft owners, pilots, and computer owners). The
Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility provided that direct mailings could be
used if they constituted advertising but not if they constituted solicitation. No definitions
of these terms were provided. Thus, the court held those provisions to be unconstitution-
ally vague. Id. at 888-89. The court stated that direct mail solicitation could be regu-
lated in a less restrictive manner than a total ban. Id. at 890; see infra notes 214-20 and
accompanying text.
168. The plaintiffs are apparently advocating that Illinois follow the approach exem-
plified in Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984). See
supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
The district court granted the plaintiff's emergency motion for a temporary restraining
order on April 26, 1984. Under the restraining order, enforcement of the old but not the
new rule against the named plaintiffs was allowed. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Currents Reports 623-24 (1985).
169. ARDC v. Adams, No. M.R. 60286 (Supreme Court of Illinois, June 25, 1984).
170. The declaratory action of the ARDC sought a ruling that Rule 2-103 "is an
appropriate exercise of the judicial power of the state of Illinois and a constitutional
regulation of commercial speech by attorneys." ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Current Reports 623 (1985).
171. ARDC v. Adams, No. 84-5711 (N.D. Ill., filed July 3, 1984). On the same day,
two similar cases that had subsequently been filed against the ARDC were consolidated
with the original complaint filed by Adams. These two cases were Zalutsky v. ARDC,
No. 84-4771 (N.D. Ill., filed June 6, 1984), and Kaplan v. ARDC, No. 84-1579 (N.D. Ill.,
filed June 19, 1984).
172. On December 4, 1984, Judge Moran ruled that the action was properly removed
to the district court, which already was considering Adams' challenge to the rule's consti-
tutionality, and therefore, the action could not be remanded. ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Current Reports 623 (1985).
173. In the interim, the United States Supreme Court has recently decided a case
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will be able to send direct mailings to targeted groups known to
require the attorney's services has yet to be resolved.
ANALYSIS
Formulating a rule governing the use of direct mailings involves
the balancing of two competing interests that are central to the
debate over advertising by attorneys. On the one hand is the very
important interest of making information about legal services
known to the public.'74 Direct mailings, in their capacity as adver-
tisements, can be used to perform this needed service. 7 ' On the
other hand, there is the equally important interest of protecting the
public from such abuses as deception and undue influence, invasion
of privacy, and the clouding of a lawyer's judgment by pecuniary
self-interest.'76 Direct mailings, in their capacity as private solici-
tation, possess the potential for these abuses.'77
Those states that permit mailings to be targeted to individuals
with an identified need for legal services in a particular matter'
involving lawyer solicitation of clients, but through newspaper advertisements rather
than direct mail. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). The advertisement in question was directed to women who
had used the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device and advised users not to assume that it
was too late to sue for their injuries. One issue addressed by the Court was whether a
state may prohibit a lawyer from accepting employment resulting from legal advice in-
cluded in printed advertisements regarding a specific legal problem. The majority,
stressing the differences between advertising and in-person solicitation, stated that a pro-
phylactic rule barring all such advertisements was not the least restrictive possible means
of achieving the asserted governmental interests of preventing overreaching, undue influ-
ence, and deception. The majority thus held that "An attorney may not be disciplined for
soliciting legal business through printed advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive
information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients." 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
A strong dissent by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, expressed the view that "the use of unsolicited legal advice to entice clients pose[d]
enough of a risk of overreaching and undue influence to warrant [a prophylactic] rule."
105 S. Ct. at 2294. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because the Court in Zauderer did not
address the issue of direct mail solicitation, which contains elements of both advertising
and in-person solicitation, the effect of this decision on restrictions on the use of mailings
is open to debate. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
CURRENT REPORTS 813 and 837 (1985).
174. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. See also McDaniel, Lawyer Ads,
71 A.B.A. J. 35 (Jan. 1985). This article sets forth the findings of a recent Federal Trade
Commission study which concluded that attorneys should be able to advertise for legal
services in any medium of communication. This conclusion is based upon a finding that
legal fees are lowest in states that allow the greatest flexibility in advertising. Id.
175. See supra text accompanying note 5.
176. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying note 6.
178. See, e.g., Spencer v. Honorable Justice of Supreme Court of Pa. 579 F. Supp. 880
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Matter of Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d
40 (1984); Connecticut State Bar, Informal Op. 81-16, (April 10, 1981), reprinted in
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clearly emphasize the first interest over the second. Although pro-
viding adequate information about legal services is a legitimate
concern, exclusive focus upon this interest may result in greater
abuses in the use of direct mailings. Persons with an identified
legal problem who may need information about legal services are
most susceptible to succumbing to undue influence. 7 9 These indi-
viduals are extremely vulnerable to suggestions of employment that
may or may not be in their best interest. 80 The potential invasion
of privacy is also much greater when the recipient has a potential
legal need,' 8 ' as illustrated in the cases of letters directed to acci-
dent victims and their families." 2
The situation is aggravated by the confidential nature of direct
mailings.' 83 There is no third party scrutiny of letters between the
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:2054 (1984) (real
estate attorney may target mailings to property owners who are trying to sell their
homes); Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-
F-78 (Oct. 17, 1984), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 801:8114 (1985) (lawyers may target mailings to defaulting mortgagors whose
homes are advertised for foreclosure). See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
179. This conclusion was reached by the ABA in Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules which
prohibits mailings targeted to persons "known to need legal services of the kind provided
by the lawyer in a particular matter." MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 (1983). The comment
following Rule 7.3 states that "A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situa-
tion giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for
reason, judgment and protective self-interest." MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 comment (1983).
See also Chralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (the plight of a "victim of misfortune" makes him more
vulnerable to influence).
180. See, e.g., State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982). The Moses court
held that an attorney could not target mailings to people who were in the process of
trying to sell their homes because of the potential for overreaching. The court stated that
this type of mailing could be regulated because it is directed to persons who "under pres-
ent economic conditions, [are] extremely vulnerable to a suggestion of employment that
may or may not be advantageous." 231 Kan. at 246, 642 P.2d at 1007. Accord Chralik,
436 U.S. at 461 n.19. See supra note 30.
181. See Chralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (the overtures of an uninvited lawyer may distress
the recipient due to their "obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's privacy")
Accord Bishop v. Commission on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n,
521 F. Supp. 1219, 1231-32 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
182. Mailings of this type are akin to the "classic... 'ambulance chasing' " seen in
Chralik, 436 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). Solicitation of accident victims in
any form usually results in producing a negative image of attorneys in the public percep-
tion. A recent example can be seen in the attacks by news organizations on lawyers who
rushed to Bhopal, India, after a toxic gas leak that killed 2500 people. Lawyers were
referred to as "vultures" by the media. See Frank, Bhopal Blowup: Are Some Lawyers
Vultures? 71 A.B.A. J. 17 (March 1985).
183. "Direct, private communications from a lawyer to a prospective client are not
subject to such third-party scrutiny and consequently are much more likely to approach
(and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and those that
are false and misleading." MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 comment par. 4 (1983). See supra
text accompanying note 63.
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attorney and thus no effective mechanism to reduce the danger of
deception. The court in Von Wiegen s4 stated that this danger
could be controlled by a filing requirement,8 5 but this would only
result in after-the-fact review. Given the highly vulnerable posi-
tion of the recipients, the damage may very well be already done. 8 6
It is interesting to note that the Von Wiegen court held that the
very letters at issue in that case were deceptive.I 7 Putting the let-
ters on file would not have made them any less so. This amply
demonstrates that the interest of informing the public may be ad-
vanced at the expense of reducing the protection against abuse.
In contrast to the liberal approach, the Illinois approach at-
tempts to balance the competing concerns in a fair and equitable
manner. First, Rule 2-103 satisfies the goal of making legal serv-
ices known to the public by permitting the use of direct mailings to
persons who, in general, might find such services to be useful.' 8
Direct mailings in these circumstances function as advertisements,
and, therefore, are allowable."8 9 Moreover, the rule acknowledges
that additional safeguards 9 ' are required due to the confidential
nature of this medium.1 91
The first safeguard provided is the requirement that the mailings
be stamped as advertising material.1 92 This requirement helps to
prevent overreaching and undue influence because the recipient is
184. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984); see supra
notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
185. Von Weigen, 63 N.Y.2d at 165, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47; see supra
note 142 and accompanying text.
186. This was one of the primary reasons that Model Rule 7.3 found that effective
regulation of mailings targeted to persons with known legal needs could not be accom-
plished by the filing requirement. The comments following the Model Rule state "[s]uch
review would be after the fact, potentially too late to avert the undesirable consequence of
disseminating false and misleading material." MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 comment par. 5
(1983).
187. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 176, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47. The
court found two deceptive statements in the attorney's letters. The first was that a litiga-
tion coordinating committee had been formed to assist the victims. In fact, the attorney
and his secretary were the sole members of the committee, and it did not exist as an entity
independent of the attorney as the statement implied. The second statement was that
many victims had contacted him requesting representation. In fact, only a few had con-
tacted the attorney, and none had requested representation. Id.
188. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b)(2) (amended 1984) set forth supra note 14.
189. "Rule 2-103(b)(2) permits general advertising mailings which are not directed to
persons known to require legal services with respect to a specific matter or problem."
ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b)(2) committee comments (amended 1984).
190. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 183.
192. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b)(2) (amended 1984); see supra note 149 and ac-
companying text.
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immediately advised of the nature of the contents and will be better
able to evaluate any unsubstantiated claims. 93 The requirement
also helps to reduce the invasion of the recipient's privacy. 94
Although a letter from the office of an attorney may compel the
recipient to open it, requiring that it be stamped as an advertise-
ment, however, lets the recipient know at once that it is not a vital
communication. 95
The second safeguard is the requirement that a copy of the mail-
ings be filed with the ARDC. 196 Without this requirement, there
would be no third-party scrutiny of the communication by a regu-
latory body. This requirement should encourage compliance with
the provisions of Rule 2-103.197 Even though the review of these
mailings will be after the fact, under the Illinois approach, the only
recipients allowed to be targeted are those with a general need
rather than those in a position of extreme vulnerability. 98
Unlike the liberal approach, Rule 2-103 meets the interest of
protecting the public from the dangers of undue influence, decep-
tion, and invasion of privacy. This is accomplished by prohibiting
mailings to "persons known in a specific matter to require such
legal services as the lawyer offers to provide."1 99 The Illinois rule
would regard mailings under these circumstances as solicitation
and therefore prohibit them.200 This prohibition not only protects
193. The recipients are also likely to be more skeptical since they are unlikely to be
especially vulnerable at the time. MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 comment par. 6 (1983).
194. This requirement was suggested by the Court in In re RMJ, 455 U.S. at 206
n.20, and also by the court in Spencer, 579 F. Supp. at 890 n.13.
195. See Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1231; Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595 (Fla.
1982).
196. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(e) (amended 1984); see supra note 150 and accompa-
nying text.
197. The committee comments point out that "although a review of such letter may
well be after the fact, the filing requirement of the Rule and the circumstance that the
lawyer's letter will be subject to the scrutiny of the Commission should be helpful in
encouraging compliance with the provisions of Rule 2-103." ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103
committee comments (amended 1984).
198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
199. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103(b)(2) (amended 1984).
200. ILLINOIS CODE Rule 2-103 committee comments (amended 1984) set forth
supra note 147. This is also the view taken by the drafters of Model Rule 7.3. Rule 7.3
prohibits mailings directed to specific recipients known to need legal services of the kind
provided by the lawyer. MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 (1983). The accompanying comments
state that, when the potential client has a known legal need, "The situation is . . .
fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching. This po-
tential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibi-
tion." MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 committee comments (1983).
Two states have adopted the Model Rules at the present time. Arizona adopted the
Model Rules on September 7, 1984, to become effetive in early 1985. ABA/BNA LAW-
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recipients who are in a vulnerable position but also comports with
the Supreme Court's observation that "[t]he rules preventing solici-
tation are prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention
of harm before it occurs. ' 20 1 Moreover, a lawyer is trained in the
art of persuasion and often trusted as an expert by the lay per-
son.20 2 Given this combination, the potential for overreaching is
great.
The Constitutionality of Illinois Code Rule 2-103
The amended rule meets the constitutional requirements enunci-
ated in In re R.M.J..203 The Court in In re R.MJ. stated that, in
order to regulate commercial speech, the state must assert a sub-
stantial interest. 2°  The interests considered in promulgating Rule
2-103 of protecting the public from overreaching, deception, and
other aspects of solicitation,20 5 are substantial and thus justify the
restrictions on direct mailings. Next, the Court in In re R.MJ.
noted that the restriction must directly advance those interests.20 6
Under the Illinois approach, these interests are directly advanced
by prohibiting the use of direct mailings in those situations where
they pose a substantial danger of abuse, where the recipients are
known to require legal services in a particular matter. Finally, In
re R.MJ. requires that the restrictions must be no more extensive
than necessary to serve those interests.20 7 Here, direct mailings are
prohibited only in those circumstances; in all other situations, the
use of direct mailings is expressly allowed. Rule 2-103 thus meets
the constitutional standard set out in In re R.M.J..
The amended rule also should withstand the constitutional chal-
lenges raised in Adams v. ARDC.208 The cases relied upon by the
plaintiffs in that case do not support a finding that Rule 2-103 is
unconstitutional.2°9 The first, Koffler v. Joint Bar Association,21°
YERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Current Reports 445-46 (1984). New
Jersey adopted the Model Rules on July 19, 1984, and the rules became effective on
September 10, 1984. Id. at 334.
201. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
202. This dangerous combination was stressed by the Ohralik Court. "[T]he poten-
tial for overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the
art of pcrs s personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay per-
son." Id. at 465.
203. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
204. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203.
205. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
206. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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held that an attorney specializing in real estate could not be pro-
hibited from mailing letters describing his services to individual
property owners.2 1 Similar mailings would be permitted under a
reasonable interpretation of Rule 2-103. Under this rule, a lawyer
may direct mailings to persons who in general might find his serv-
ices to be useful. Here, the recipients, as property owners, might
find the services of a real estate attorney to be useful. There is
some evidence in Koffler that a few of the recipients were in the
process of trying to sell their homes and thereby were in need of
legal services in a specific matter.1 2 These recipients are poten-
tially more vulnerable to suggestions of employment that may not
be in their best interests.21 3 Accordingly, Rule 2-103 would not
permit mailings to be specifically targeted to these individuals.
General mailings would, however, be permissible under the rule.
Thus, the restriction is no more extensive than necessary to serve
the interest of protecting the public.
The plaintiffs in Adams also rely on Spencer v. Justices of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.21 4 In Spencer, an attorney specializ-
ing in aviation and computer law wanted to send mailings to pilots,
plane owners, and computer owners in violation of Pennsylvania's
blanket prohibition against targeted mailings.21 5 The court held
that this blanket prohibition could not withstand constitutional
analysis. 2 6 Although the Spencer court stated that prohibiting at-
torneys from selecting as recipients "those who may be most in
need of a lawyer's services" ignores the important role of these
mailings as a device to inform the public,21 7 the court did acknowl-
edge that there are circumstances under which a ban is appropri-
ate.2"' To ban their use, the state must identify specific situations
where the mailings posed a danger of overreaching or undue influ-
210. 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1026 (1981).
211. Id. at 151,412 N.E.2d at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878-79.
212. See Comment, supra note 38, at 409, where the letters sent by the attorney in
Koffler are reproduced.
213. See supra note 180.
214. 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
215. Id. at 888. The court stated that some of those whom the attorney sought to
mail to "may have a legal problem or may be in need of a lawyer." Id. There is no
further explanation of the type of legal problem that is being referred to.
216. Id. at 888-91.
217. Id. at 891.
218. The court listed two situations: first, where "mail recipients [are] particularly
susceptible or vulnerable to the persuasive influence contained in a lawyer's letter," id. at
890; and second, where direct mail solicitation may cause conflicts of interest. Id.
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ence. " This is what the Illinois rule has done. The rule carves
out a specific factual situation when the use of direct mailings poses
a substantial risk of abuse, when the recipients require legal serv-
ices in a specific matter, and has prohibited their use only in those
instances.220 Consequently, Spencer would not support a holding
that the Illinois rule is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Before amending Rule 2-103, the Illinois Supreme Court had to
consider what weight should be given to two competing concerns.
The court recognized the important need to provide information
about legal services to the public. In so doing, the court did not
ignore the equally important need to protect vulnerable segments
of the public from abuses, such as overreaching and undue influ-
ence. The rule as amended reflects a careful balance of these con-
cerns to the benefit of both. If any one interest is subsequently to
be given more weight, it will be at the expense of the other, and the
balance will be destroyed. The rule should therefore be allowed to
remain as it is.
SUSAN I. MATEJCAK
219. Id.
220. See supra text accompanying note 207.
[Vol. 16
